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MAÏA SINNO
THE GULF’S TAKEOVER OF CAIRO’S  
REAL ESTATE MEGAPROJECTS
ABSTRACT
One of the revolutionary demands of the Egyptian popular uprising in 
2011 was for a more equitable city. Six years later, new community of actors 
defining Cairo’s urban production and governance methods is little concerned 
with reducing the social gap in Egypt’s capital city. In recent years, a redefini-
tion of public actors and regional partnerships has modified investment 
practices. The real estate and construction markets in Egypt are prioritized by 
the state and attract capital. Gulf countries in particular have succeeded in 
reviving the property market in Greater Cairo, which had stagnated since 
2011, through numerous loans, donations, and announcements of massive 
real estate projects. However, the progressive regionalisation of Cairo is not a 
sign of the market’s openness to global financing, but rather a sign of the 
state’s reinforcement of urban production.
INTRODUCTION
Since 2011, Gulf countries have become inescapable, not only as geopo-
litical partners, but also as privileged investors, particularly in the real estate 
and construction sectors in Greater Cairo. The United Arab Emirates and 
Saudi Arabia have provided extensive political and economic support to the 
new regime, which has ruled since summer 2013. While the images of numer-
ous Egyptian companies have been damaged by corruption scandals, Gulf 
developers like Emaar or Majid al Futtaim Group have continued to wield 
social and urban influence. The Gulf is presented as an idealised model of 
urban modernisation and standardisation by the Egyptian government through 
real estate megaprojects, such as Capital Cairo. Gulf investors have become 
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dominant partners in the property market in Great Cairo. Furthermore, these 
economic and political actors from the Gulf States support the military, a new 
public interlocutor in Egypt, upon which real estate transactions in Cairo 
exclusively depend. The army’s monopoly over the real estate and construc-
tion sectors allows for power to be extended to investors from various Gulf 
countries. These actors have redefined the Cairo real estate market, demon-
strating that the state’s withdrawal from urban production and the 
empowerment of the private sector in urban governance remain illusory. 
These political and international relationships build the façade of the Egyptian 
liberal transition. The case of Cairo also shows that the model of managerial 
and entrepreneurial governance in urban production is not universal. This 
article will first examine the way that various actors redefined Cairo’s real 
estate and construction markets after 2011, and then examine the Gulf’s influ-
ence on Cairo’s urban planning.
THE RETURN OF THE STATE TO URBAN  
PRODUCTION THROUGH THE MILITARY 
The overthrow of President Mohammed Morsi in July 2013 allowed 
Marshal Abdel-Fattah al-Sissi to lead the transition period before ascending to 
the presidency one year later. The growing importance of the army in urban 
production contradicts theories on the financialisation of the city (Baraud 
Serfaty, 2008; Harvey, 1989; Theurillat, 2011), which specifically mention the 
withdrawal of the state from urban governance.
The increasing importance of the military in urban production
Ahmad M., sales manager at the Egyptian real estate company SODIC, 
described the procedure to follow for real estate investors in Cairo: “One should 
first go to the investment ministry to be sent to the ‘housing’ or ‘tourism’ depart-
ment. Then it is time to buy the land. The construction can begin only when the 
company receives authorisation from the involved ministry. Sometimes market 
studies are made by private contractors at the beginning of the project, but this 
is not mandatory. The Ministry of Investment only advises on the construction 
standards in terms of size or buildable waterfronts. There are very few links 
between a real estate investor and the authorities in charge of urban planning 
during the process. Lastly, one of the most important pieces of advice comes 
from the Ministry of Security Forces. The magic word is always ‘relationships!’” 1 
According to Aclimandos 2, the question of land was always central to the army 
and, today, the institution has become a major construction actor and the 
1. Interview, Cairo, 16/05/2014.
2. Email interview, 30/09/2016.
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monopolistic owner of lands around Greater Cairo. The new regime in place 
since July 2013 allowed the army to recover its financial health and to become 
the only interlocutor for major investments in Egypt, as a public actor also 
involved with private interests. Ultimately, the state seems to have asserted its 
leadership in urban governance partly through the military.
This leadership is summarized in the New Investment Law Number 17, 
issued in March 2015 with the launch of the Economic Summit, and revised 
in May 2017. The goal of this law is to attract private capital and to create a 
“one-stop shop” under government supervision for potential investors. The 
recent modifications are particularly interesting for foreign real estate inves-
tors specialised in luxury housing, as they allow for the transfer of profits 
abroad without any restrictions and with tax exemption for ten years, in order 
to revive real estate sector 3. Moreover, amendments to the new law allow all 
parties to allocate land, rather than allocating it through the General Authority 
for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI) 4. The army is thus authorized to sell 
land without any institutional intermediary. This reinforces the hegemony of 
the state, which can collect income from land concessions. The new Egyptian 
government is acting like a rentier state, using profits from private investments 
in Cairo’s real estate and construction sectors for institutional and personal 
benefit. Since the economic crisis following the 2011 popular uprising, the 
sale of land in Greater Cairo has become a way to attract private investments. 
The financialisation of the city implies the progressive withdrawal of the pub-
lic sector from urban production (Baraud-Serfaty, 2008). However, the 
Egyptian government seems to have remained central to the process, since the 
military is now entwined with the state. 
The restructuring of the ruling community
The attractiveness of a metropolis is partly based on adapted urban poli-
cies and dynamic local systems of actors (Aveline-Dubach, 2008, p. 49). 
However, after 2011, numerous real estate contractors faced charges related 
to the fraudulent acquisition of land. The former ruling community, previously 
consisting in former president Hosni Mubarak’s inner circle controlling the 
elite of the private sector (Gobe, 1999), has since been reorganised.
After the overthrow of Mohammed Morsi in July 2013, the new govern-
ment reshuffled the ministerial team but some ministers remained from the 
former regime. The former president of the two bodies in charge of fiscal con-
trol and investment under Mubarak, Ziad Bahaeddine, was nominated in 
2013 as Deputy Premier. That same year, Ahmad Galal, the executive director 
of the Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies funded by Gamal Mubarak, 
3. Al Aees, Daily News Egypt, 15/05/2017.
4. Ayyad and Fahmy, Daily News Egypt, 26/06/2016.
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became Minister of Finance. 5 This action was the first step towards consolidat-
ing an economic system based on corrupt interactions between governmental 
and private actors. It was followed by several cabinet reshuffles.
Moreover, the new Investment Law includes vague concepts enabling the 
misappropriation of public funds and the use of corrupt methods 6. It also gives 
the right to any minister in charge to issue contracts in case of emergency by 
direct order. According to ex-presidential candidate and director of the Egyptian 
Centre for Economic and Social Rights, Khaled Ali, it was a clear signal of rec-
onciliation with corrupt businessmen from the Mubarak regime, as well as a 
message to investors that contracts signed before 2011 would not be cancelled 7. 
Some of the businessmen close to the former regime, particularly in the 
real estate sector, have indeed had to pay a heavy price. In November 2015, 
the Attorney General received several complaints filed against businessman 
Salah Diab, his son, and other businessmen. They were accused of having 
bought lands located on the desert road between Cairo and Alexandria with 
funds from the Ministry of Agriculture. Public fund prosecutors led investiga-
tions of the New Giza real estate project and targeted Diab, his partners, and 
their investment company Sunset Hills for wasting public funds. Diab and his 
son were arrested and bank accounts belonging to Diab, his wife, and the 
father-in-law of the former president’s son, Mahmud Al-Gammal, were frozen. 
The Egyptian stock exchange also froze his assets, as well as those of fifteen 
other businessmen 8. 
Nevertheless, some other businessmen close to the former Mubarak 
regime were given the option to erase the charges against them in exchange 
of a certain amount of money. In 2015, the government settled with the rich 
Sawiris family for a deposit of $357 million. In August 2015, an official deci-
sion from the court lifted a travel ban on six Egyptian businessmen, despite a 
trial about illicitly acquired gains that had been on hold since 2011. One of 
these men was Madgy Rasekh, the father-in-law of Mubarak’s son Alaa 
Mubarak. Rasekh was accused of misappropriating public funds with the help 
of Mubarak’s former Minister of Housing, Ibrahim Salman 9.
The Sissi government might try to resolve most of its outstanding disputes 
with investors, because these trials have a double cost: the decline of stock 
exchange values and investors’ fear of meeting a similar fate. In addition, 
some of these trials allow the government to collect money, which is espe-
cially useful during the current economic crisis. The trials also answer popular 
demands. These reconciliations are also a way for the new regime to put pres-
sure on a circle of private actors regarding any refusal of allegiance. The 
reconstitution of the ruling class is based on a strong and centralised 
5. Al-Korachi, Al Ahram Hebdo, 23/10/2013.
6. Koppeser, Daily News Egypt, 06/05/2014.
7. Ibid. 
8. Farid, Daily News Egypt, 21/11/2015.
9. Ibid.
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governmental power and on private elite who play a fundamental role in the 
growth of the economy. Corruption allows for the reproduction of a power 
balance between the public and private sectors and reinforces the govern-
ment’s importance. Despite new legal measures, corruption and baksheesh 
practices remain essential to investment transactions in Egypt. The new regime 
reproduces the same scheme that was in force during the Mubarak presidency 
and produces only a neoliberal front. 
Emergency partnership choices
The financial and political support of Gulf countries was fundamental for 
the Egyptian economy and the consolidation of new regimes. The following 
graph shows how much Egyptian growth suffered after the 2011 Revolution:
Figure 1. Egyptian Annual GPD growth (%) 2008/17
Source: World Bank
Loans and donations from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait 
and Qatar allowed Egypt to refuse several times since 2011 a loan worth over 
$4 billion that was proposed by the IMF. The IMF loan was proposed in 
exchange for unpopular reforms, such as the removal of subsidies. 10 Gulf coun-
try aid was delivered as loans, donations, and in-kind support, such as energy. 
10. Lettres économiques d’Égypte from September 2012 to May 2017.
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This aid was more appealing than IMF loan proposal and did not require major 
structural changes. Nevertheless, this support remained unstable and fragile. 
The year following the 2011 Revolution was a year of transition. Many 
countries, Gulf countries included, provided support to maintain the health of 
the suffering Egyptian economy. Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohammed 
Morsi was elected in 2012. Qatar became the main supporter of the new 
regime. The Qatari government loaned a total of $8 billion and donated $1 
billion. It also promised to invest $10 billion in a huge tourist complex near 
Alamein and $8 billion in an infrastructure renovation project in the Port Said 
region. These projects were supposed to bring back investor confidence in 
Egypt, as well as to take advantage of the strength of the Qatari-Egyptian part-
nership, but they were never implemented. 11 
After the overthrow of Mohammed Morsi in July 2013, negotiations 
between Egypt and Qatar halted amidst political tensions. In September 2013, 
Egypt repaid $2 billion of aid to Qatar. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates led a coalition including Kuwait and Bahrain to propose $12 billion 
of aid that summer, to be followed by more. However, the amount of dis-
bursement was much lower although still relevant 12. These announcements 
reinforced the perceived importance of Gulf countries to the survival of 
Egyptian economy. For fiscal year 2013/14, the Egyptian Central Bank regis-
tered more than $11 billion of Gulf aid. 13 Egypt’s total budget deficit fell to 
12.4% of GDP ($14 billion) in 2013/14, from 13.8% of GDP in 2012/13, 
according to a report from the Central Bank of Egypt. The report also indicated 
that total revenue of the budget sector (the administrative system, local admin-
istration and service authorities) amounted to $22 billion in fiscal year 
2013/14, while total expenditures reached $35.5 billion. 14
At the end of 2013, numerous conferences and economic agreements 
between Egypt and the Gulf coalition encouraged the reinforcement of eco-
nomic and politic partnerships. The goal was to erase the accusations that had 
been levelled against some Gulf investors and to offer investment opportuni-
ties, as well as to remove barriers to foreign investment in Egypt. Nonetheless, 
Gulf aid dried up progressively after 2014 for both political and economic 
reasons. Loans and donations were replaced by Foreign Direct Investments 
(FDI). The following graph shows a significant increase of Gulf FDI in Egypt 
starting in 2014, particularly from the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. 
Qatar provided more FDI than Saudi Arabia in 2012/13, but decreased its FDI 




14. Alsahary, Egypt Independent, 02/10/2014. 
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Figure 2. Foreign Direct Investments in Egypt from Gulf countries in million USD by fiscal year 
(2007-2016)
Source: Central Bank of Egypt
In 2016, the Egyptian government had to find emergency economic alter-
natives. Despite a slight economic upturn, the economy remained fragile. In 
March 2016, the government decided to devaluate the Egyptian Pound in 
order to encourage negotiations with the IMF. At the beginning of 2017, the 
IMF provided a $12 billion to Egypt, as well as an economic and financial 
support programme based on liberalisation and social protection reforms. 
Egypt is also targeting $12 billion during the next three years from other cred-
itors, such as the World Bank and African Development Bank. 15
International aid from Gulf countries or from international organizations 
remains Egypt’s leverage for growth. Egypt’s dependence on international 
creditors is not new, but it significantly increased after 2011 and reinforced 
the rentier state management. When Gulf countries became less generous, the 
government turned to the IMF, after having refused the organization’s initial 
proposal six years ago. These emergency alternatives are still following short 
or mid-term objectives. Gulf countries have become inescapable. They remain 
creditors who may potentially ask for repayment. They also are investors 
whose weight in the Egyptian economy is increasing, particularly in the real 
estate and construction markets, as well as political partners chosen by the 
new authoritarian regime.




The increased power of the army, the corruption of the ruling community 
and the dependence of the country on international aid after 2013 do not fos-
ter the liberalisation of the Egyptian economy. Cairobserver blogger Elshahed 
(21/01/2011) denounced the façade of liberalisation: “When the military is 
arguably the biggest land owner with no civilian oversight [sic] makes a direct 
and opaque deal with a developer to build an exclusive and gated community 
in the heart of the capital, this is not a free market.” The economic openness 
initiated in the 1970s allowed for the transfer of wealth into the hands of a 
private sector elite chosen by the state, while the positive growth rates from 
before the revolution hid the chronic impoverishment of the majority of the 
Egyptian population (Hanieh, Social Democracy, 14/02/2017). The new 
regime produces the same economic line of dictatorial liberalisation as the 
Mubarak regime. Foreign capital is welcome but there is no freedom of invest-
ment, as investment is conditioned by the political network and corruption. 
The bureaucracy remains thick despite the recent new law. 
The IMF has confirmed the supremacy of a central and authoritarian state. 16 
The macroprudential policy and the financial stability of Egypt are guaranteed 
by the Central bank, a predominant decision-making body. In Egypt, Bank activ-
ities represent the majority of the financial activities. This phenomenon makes 
the banks more vulnerable to economic cycle variations, due to the concentra-
tion of credit in sectors that are sensitive to economic cycles; this was 
demonstrated by the fall of the touristic sector after 2011. Liquidity problems, 
credit concentration and sectoral sensitivity are the main risks for Egyptian 
banks. Their growth is also limited by the lack of reforms implemented since 
their privatization and the arrival of foreign banks in the country.
Paradoxically the limits of Egyptian economic development guarantee the 
continuity of the former neoliberal system for the new regime. The reforms 
undertaken following the World Bank’s recommendations through the new 
Investment Law seem to promote the withdrawal of the state, more economic 
openness and the simplification of procedures. And yet, the “one-stop shop” 
system is very similar to a trading post held by the Egyptian government to wel-
come foreign investors in order to multiply investments. Hence the state is the 
only decision-maker for major economic strategies: whether to accept or refuse 
further negotiations concerning the IMF loan, to turn to some creditors rather 
than others, to privilege some investors depending on their provenance and 
their political and economic support, or to pursue charges against some inves-
tors rather than others. Moreover, the new regime enlarged the national 
economic and political elite to Gulf investors whose companies are partly or 
totally financed by their states. The founder and president of Emaar Properties, 
16. IMF Working Paper, 2016.
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Mohammed Alabbar, is not only a businessman, but also a close advisor to 
Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, ruler of Dubai. The United Arab 
Emirates government owns 32% of the company. 17, 18 The companies of the Al 
Futtaim family, related by tribal and marital links to the ruling family of Dubai, 
the Al Maktoum family, supported the country’s development, even before the 
discovery of hydrocarbons. 19 Qatari Diar is a company from the sovereign fund 
of Qatar. 20 Thus these investors provide the Egyptian ruling community with the 
political support of their states and the economic power of their companies.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GULF  
IN THE URBAN PRODUCTION OF CAIRO AFTER 2011
The excellent relationships of Gulf investors with the Egyptian government 
after July 2013, and the increase of Gulf FDI after 2014 gave these business-
men the opportunity to play an important role in the growth of Cairo’s real 
estate and construction sectors. The increased importance of these actors in 
urban production also influenced the urban planning of Cairo. Can we talk 
about a progressive internationalisation of the Egyptian metropolis when the 
financialisation of the city remains in an early stage (Sims, 2010, p. 148) due 
to the façade of the Egyptian economy’s liberalisation and the weakness of 
financial activities?
Cairo’s real estate and construction sectors and some promising markets
The construction of real estate projects in Cairo is a way to create employ-
ment, as well as new urban economic centres such as malls, compounds and 
hotels. The real estate and construction sectors are closely connected and 
major real estate and construction investments in Cairo promote a modern-
ized view of the country in order to attract more investors. While space is 
lacking in Cairo, desert lands around the city are blank areas up for conquest 
by developers. These lesser-value areas would be valorised by their invest-
ments; however, once a project has been completed and become a part of 
urban territory, there are fewer possibilities for creating land value and 
employment. This is confirmed by Ahmad E., former banker and businessman, 
who said: 21 “When land is bought in Egypt, it is forever, regardless of the 
buyer, except for the lands bought in the Sinai. The problem in this sector is 
that it doesn’t create long-term employment. When the project is built, there is 
17. Reed, Bloomberg, 22/06/2014. 
18. Boyle, Forbes, 17/09/2014. 
19. Belkaïd, Afrique Méditerranée Business, 18/07/2014.
20. Reuters, 03/10/2012, consulté le 25/04/2017.
21. Interview, Fifth Settlement, 06/19/2014.
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nothing else to do.” After a decline of around 3 to 4%, between 2010 and 
2012, the annual growth of the construction sector reached 11.2% in 2015/16 
according to the French Embassy’s economic service. 22 This sector became 
the primary engine of the Egyptian economy, ahead of the Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT) sector. It attracted $580 million of invest-
ments in 2015/16, which represent 3% of total investments and 5.4% of GDP. 
It employed 13.6% of the labour force, or 3.5 million of people. Despite the 
increase of residential and non-residential demand from the Egyptian popula-
tion, the progression of the market growth has remained limited by heavy 
bureaucracy and the dependence on imports. 
Based on data from the Central Bank of Egypt, the following graph shows 
the GDP of the construction sector at factor cost has increased constantly, 
whereas the GDP of the real estate sector increased significantly starting in 
2012/13. Nonetheless, this data contradicts the conclusions of the French 
Embassy’s economic service on the evolution of the construction sector. 
Surprisingly, the development of the GDP of these two sectors is not following 
the development of Egyptian growth shown previously. The post-2011 eco-
nomic crisis does not seem to have had a direct impact on these sectors. This 
might be partly due to the change of reference prices between 2010/11 and 
2011/12. However, data related to Egypt is difficult to verify.
Figure 3. GDP of real estate and construction sectors at factor cost in million Egyptian Pounds 
(2007/11: 2006/07 prices; 2012/15: 2011/12 prices)
Source: Annual reports of the Central Bank of Egypt
22. Lettre économique d’Égypte, February 2017.
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Some individuals deny the constant increase in real estate sector revenues. 
The executive director of an Egyptian real estate company based in Cairo, 
Mohammed Hassan A., explains his vision of market fluctuations after 2011 
as follows: 23 “The real estate sector is the sector which suffered the most after 
the Revolution. Before 2011, real estate investments were for stupid people 
who were unable to do business. These investments were easy investments. 
The problem is that after the revolution there was a liquidity problem. People 
could not pay anymore and companies did not want to collapse. This situation 
caused the stagnation of the market. Everybody was waiting for the prices to 
fall. This sector became healthy again thanks to Arab investments.” Researcher 
Randa A. 24 used the term “hysterical speculation” to describe sales in Uptown 
Cairo, a compound project in Cairo launched in 2006 by Dubai-based Emaar. 
Real estate companies from Gulf countries are omnipresent and benefit along-
side Egyptian companies from the recovery of the housing market. After a 
break following the transitional period post-2011, the construction process 
continued. Emaar sold all the houses, villas and apartments of several “vil-
lages” in Uptown Cairo, and Marassi, a project started in 2008, before total 
completion. Majid al Futtaim Group, an Emirati company, has also completed 
the construction of its retail and real estate project in Fifth Settlement, Festival 
City, started in 2008. 
In theory, real estate megaprojects make their own financial balance, which 
leads to few risks and assured solvency (Lorrain, 2011, p. 110). These condi-
tions are commonly met in industrialised countries, but not necessarily in 
emerging countries. Political stability is also a condition for reducing risks and 
attracting FDI. It is surprising that shortly after major economic and political 
upheaval, the real estate and construction sectors were considered by investors 
to be safe. By announcing real estate megaprojects and massively investing in 
Cairo’s real estate and construction sectors, Gulf companies have played an 
important role in the dimunition of risk, as a kind of gamble on the future. “The 
Gulf is a brand name which builds confidence in the Egyptian real estate mar-
ket,” said architect and professor at United Arab Emirates University, Khaled 
Adham. 25 In theory, the responsibility of risk is partly borne by the private sec-
tor, allowing for the state’s progressive withdrawal from urban production 
(Baraud-Serfaty, 2008). However, in Egypt, the assumption of risk is partly 
absorbed by a regional private sector in a political and economic bet. In the 
real estate and construction sectors, the Egyptian state became dependent on 
the private sector of Gulf countries, mainly the United Arab Emirates. 
23. Interview, Cairo, 14/04/2014.
24. Interview, Fifth Settlement, 14/05/2014.
25. Interview, Paris, 16/10/2015.
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Arabtec’s social housing megaproject on hold
Are these Gulf megaprojects a real success? Are they really achieved? In 
2012, Qatar pledged to invest $18 billion in Egyptian tourism and infrastruc-
ture as a way to strengthen links between Qatar and Egypt during Morsi’s 
presidency. The change of the Egyptian regime after July 2013 and the sudden 
breakdown of the friendship between the two countries cancelled these plans. 
Another example of these real estate megaproject announcements is Arabtec 
Construction’s proposed project. In March 2014, the Dubai-based construc-
tion company announced that it would build one million social housing units 
in Egypt in a $40 billion project backed by the Egyptian and United Arab 
Emirates governments, as part of efforts to address the country’s housing short-
age. The project was to be completed by 2020, and the housing to be spread 
across ten governorates. 
Nonetheless the project seems to be unfeasible. According to NGO director 
Mohammed I., 26 “The Arabtec project is statistically impossible. Egypt’s total real 
estate construction is way less important. Here we speak about only one proj-
ect, one company, which would alone build 2.5 times the number of units built 
annually in Egypt. This project is more about speculation. Arabtec will probably 
face numerous obstacles and stop the project, and it could have a very negative 
impact on production. Above all it is a political project which will affect the cost 
of apartments at the end.” Ahmad E., a former banker and businessman, 27 con-
firmed: “The project should be complete after five years. That means one unit 
built per minute. It would be possible if 500 companies were working on it as of 
now. And I do not talk about the problems of necessary roads, water and gas. A 
new power station would have to be built. Also this is not a social housing proj-
ect. The announced $40 billion project amount means that every apartment 
would cost $40,000: $ 5,000 for the land, $25,000 for the construction and 
design, and $10,000 for the roads and profit margin. It seems quite logical and 
realistic to me. But at this price it is not for poor classes, contrary to what was 
announced by the company. The project is rather aimed at the middle class. 
One thing is for sure: this project is far from its end.”
Despite popular demand during the 2011 uprising for more justice, which 
pushed back against fraudulent land sales to Egyptian and Arab investors, this 
type of megaproject is still aimed at the middle-class and the rich. The Egyptian 
Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) report from 2014 sharply criticised the 
Arabtec project: 28 “The conditions may deny 40 percent of Egyptians—all of 
them from the poorest segments —access to some EGP 8.1 billion in public 
subsidies and investments as allocated in the state budgets of 2012/2013 and 
2013/2014. The conditions also deny almost two-thirds of Egyptians working in 
the informal sector—most of them poor—access to housing units under the 
26. Interview, Cairo, 27/05/2014.
27. Interview, Fifth Settlement, 19/06/2014.
28. Shawkat, Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, April 2014.
137
THE GULF’S TAKEOVER OF CAIRO’S REAL ESTATE MEGAPROJECTS
project because they work without formal employment contracts. Based on 
previous housing projects, as much as 90 percent of the housing units in the 
project may be allocated as ownership units via mortgages. As such, some 50 
percent of Egyptians will not benefit from the units, as they will not be able to 
meet the minimum income threshold for a mortgage.”
As of June 2016, the project still remained on hold. According to Raja 
Hani Ghanma, CEO of Arabtec Construction, the project, which can be scaled 
back from its original one million houses to 100,000, has seen little progress 
from the Egyptian Ministry of Housing. In October 2015, Arabtec put forward 
a proposal to start implementing the project at the reduced 100,000 figure, 
but received no confirmation of support from Egypt’s housing ministry. 29 This 
confirms the state’s control of major urban transactions. Whether the project 
is completed or not, it is a political project above all, dependent on the good 
relationships between Egypt and United Arab Emirates. It aims neither to 
resolve the housing crisis, nor even to be realistic. It is mainly a way to regain 
investors’ confidence, even if it causes another speculation phenomenon 
involving the increase of housing prices and an exclusive city.
Cairo Capital, a Gulf capital in Egypt
The dream of Cairo without its popular side and its dustiness might come 
true with the new administrative capital project, Cairo Capital, launched in 
2016. The new city, covering 700 square kilometres, would cost $45 billion and 
be located between Cairo and the Red Sea. 30 The government presented the 
project as a programme that would solve numerous problems in post-revolu-
tionary Egypt, including the housing crisis, rising inflation, and increasing 
unemployment. The goal is to start from zero, as Cairo has become charged 
with strong popular symbols. Emaar imagined Uptown Cairo, a gated commu-
nity in the centre of the city, as the new city centre for the upper classes in 
opposition to Downtown Cairo, the public space of popular social classes and 
the symbolic place of the 2011 Revolution. Likewise Capital Cairo was imag-
ined in opposition to crowded and dirty Cairo. The project plan was drawn up 
in 1985 in the fourth year of Mubarak’s 30-year rule by geologist Farouk El-Baz. 
According to Sims (2015, p. 117) the inefficiency of the state drives it to repeat 
its errors, such as the creation of new cities in the desert, which are a huge 
waste of land, money, and resources. According to Sims, this type of project is 
not a long-term project, decided after studies and strategic planning, but rather 
a headlong rush in order to postpone the resolution of urgent crises and to give 
the president exposure and fame. Of course, the feasibility of such a project is 
also not obvious. 31 Middle East Eye pointed out mistakes made during the pre-
29. Halligan N., Arabian Business, 23/06/2016.
30. Lettre économique d’Égypte n°69, February 2017.
31. Middle East Eye, 17/03/2015.
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sentation of the project in March 2015: “While several experts highlighted the 
premature nature of the plans that seem to be more of a “propaganda stunt” to 
attract investors, Sayyad [Cairo specialist, Professor of Architecture, Planning, 
Urban Design and Urban History at University of California, Berkeley] pointed 
out that images of Egypt’s new capital revealed during the economic conference 
were actually of Marina Bay Sands and Gardens by the Bay in Singapore. “What 
should have been truly embarrassing is that some of the images shown in a 
video at the conference [were] in the presence of a delegation from the country 
[Singapore] from which they were stolen with no apparent shame.” Ahmad 
Selim (Mada Masr, 05/08/2015) denounced the idealization of a pixelated 
world with futuristic architecture that is completely disconnected from reality. 
According to him, this state propaganda exclusively serves to consolidate Sissi’s 
government. The commercials are reminiscent of Gulf urbanisation, with high 
towers and futuristic architecture.
 Figure 4. Cairo Capital Commercial
 Source : http://thecapitalcairo.com/index.html 
Emaar CEO Mohammed Alabbar, was supposed to be one of the main 
funders of the project. Alabbar and Sissi signed a memorandum of understand-
ing on March 2015 with the endorsement of Dubai Emir Sheikh Mohammed 
bin Rashid Al-Maktoum, but Alabbar stepped down from the project in January 
2016. The Egyptian state turned then to two Chinese state-owned companies, 
China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) and China Fortune 
Land Development Company (CFLD), which eventually stepped down as well. 
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The goal of attracting FDI in order to build a new capital failed, so Egypt has 
had no choice but to call on Egyptian private companies.
Relationships between Gulf countries and the new regime are comparable 
to North-South relationships between Mediterranean Europe and Arab coun-
tries from South of the Mediterranean Sea. 32 Gulf countries have become an 
increasingly dominant “North” for Egypt after 2011, as cultural proximity 
encourages political and economic relationships between two circles: the 
Egyptian ruling community and the Gulf public-private community. The pro-
duction of Cairo is incrementally influenced by the model of Dubai, whether 
it is financed with Gulf capital or not, and depends on the fluctuations of 
Gulf-Egypt relations more than of the market. Moreover, the new agreements 
are settled on a state-to-state basis, ignoring logical investment steps such as 
market studies or financial risk calculations. Thanks to corrupt practices, these 
agreements foster alternative circulations of capital. The regionalisation of 
Cairo reduces possibilities for a true openness of the city to the global finan-
cial markets, and reinforces the urban market’s dependence on a strong 
regional circle. Lastly, this Cairo of the future, imagined as a city outside of 
Egypt, standing in the middle of an Arab desert, becomes estranged from mil-
lennium Cairo, with the passage of time since 25 January 2011.
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